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NATION-BUILDING AND THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER

by

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
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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract of  
NATION-BUILDING AND THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the absence of a global threat and the prohibitive economics of retaining a large forward deployed military have caused the U.S. to re-think its military strategy. The results are a more regional strategic focus and a new emphasis on assistance in lieu of military force. This new focus has given greater dimensions to the CINC's responsibilities, requiring him to employ all instruments of national power to one end--the security and stability of his region. The melding of national means to this end is nation-building--a coordinated approach for advancing a nation by developing its infrastructure and institutions.

This paper is intended as an introduction to nation-building, and is therefore, limited in scope. It examines neither the politics nor costs involved in the nation-building mission. Rather, it looks at this mission from a historical and current perspective; and addresses the means available to the CINC for nation-building.

It is the conclusion of this paper that nation-building is a viable mission for the CINC, if executed in conjunction with diplomacy.

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# NATION-BUILDING AND THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Nation-[building] is a methodical, coordinated interagency approach to enhancing security through mutually agreed-upon requirements for infrastructure and institutional development. It addresses the root causes of instability by focusing collective energies and capabilities toward the development of key host nation institutions, both public and private.<sup>1</sup>

The Problem. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the U.S. strategic outlook has shifted from a global to a regional focus. The elimination of the communist monolith has deleted the need for the U.S. to maintain a worldwide forward presence. Today, such a presence is ". . . economically burdensome and [has] . . . a limiting effect on U.S. National-security policy . . . creating strong political and economic pressures on policy makers to initiate offensive action when other less expensive options . . . could achieve U.S. objectives."<sup>2</sup>

However, a form of U.S. forward presence is still required. The disintegration of the old bi-polar world has unleashed new problems and forces onto the world stage. These forces, based in religion, ethnicity and economics, are capable of molding a diverse and perilous strategic landscape. And, since they are not of a strictly military nature, they cannot be countered solely by military means. Instead, a combination of national power--diplomatic, economic, humanitarian and military--must be

used. Does this then discount the use of military force? No. "The military instrument of national power will remain relevant, but it will have to be closely integrated with political and economic instruments to be effective."<sup>3</sup>

The regional U.S. commander-in-chief (CINC) has an important role to play in this new era of regional crisis response.

The new Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) requires the Unified Commanders (CINCs) to develop a full range of flexible deterrent options (FDOs). . . . Whereas the previous JSCP focused on planning to deter the global Soviet threat, the new JSCP views regional contingencies as the most likely threat to U.S. national interests. This new planning focus directs the CINCs to apply a new, adaptive planning approach to generate a full range of FDOs . . . These varied, graduated options are intended to minimize the use of force and prevent escalation while still achieving national objectives.<sup>4</sup>

Therefore, the CINC must create an environment that arrests the possibility of war utilizing all instruments of national power, i.e., diplomatic, informational, economic and military. Forward presence remains a key option for accomplishing this task, but in a new form--that of nation-building.

In On War Clausewitz writes of the "holy trinity" which consists of the military, the government and the people. He cautions that if the trinity is to succeed, all three of its parts must be strong and melded into one purpose. Nation-building can assist in achieving this end. It can strengthen a country's people and its institutions. It is a particularly effective tool in an era of low intensity conflict<sup>5</sup>, when the

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<sup>5</sup> Low Intensity Conflict: "Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. . . . It

success of a government and its military mission requires legitimate public support.

In peacetime military operations . . . civilians are objectives of military operations, since mobilizing public support is a major politico-military objective in low intensity conflict, or LIC. Civic action, humanitarian and civic assistance . . . are especially important to LIC since they can help mobilize the public support required for mission success."

Nation-building is an important mission for a CINC. It provides an inexpensive and low manpower means of bringing stability and security to a region; and allows the U.S. to develop strong and self-sufficient allies. These allies enhance U.S. security by increasing the stability of the region; acting as a buffer between the U.S. and possible aggressors; and serving as a force multiplier in case of conflict. Therefore, it is important that the CINC understand the nation-building mission and how to effectively execute it.

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is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments." (JCS Pub 1-02) U.S. Army and Air Force Departments, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, (Washington, DC: 1990), p. Glossary-5.

## CHAPTER II

### HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Thomas Jefferson envisioned the military as being closely fused to civilian society. He believed that when not engaged in war, it should be used for civilian purposes. This was his reasoning in establishing West Point as a school for engineers and not professional war fighters. He believed that the military must not only protect the country but assist in building it as well. Therefore, military officers were considered essential to exploring, building and administering the new nation.<sup>6</sup> Thus, as the U.S. expanded, it was the military that spearheaded the move westward; ensured the security of the frontier; administered territories; and built much of the infrastructure.

Pre-World War II. Over the last 200 years the military has proven successful at nation-building both at home and abroad. Though the political motives for U.S. nation-building were frequently imperialistic, they could not detract from the success and the positive impact of the military's efforts. Following the takeover of the Philippines in 1898, the military built the country from the inside out. It introduced elective government; built the country's infrastructure; and prepared the people for self-rule. Later, similar success was also achieved in Nicaragua and Haiti. Again, the political motives may have been tainted but the mission was successful. "U.S. officials,



accomplished widespread reforms: financial chaos was eliminated; . . . graft was diminished; and a program of public works, sanitation and public health, education, and agricultural development was instituted." The U.S., particularly the military, proved it had the capability to successfully build a nation.

Post-World War II. Following World War II the U.S. Military was again involved in nation-building. Throughout Europe and Asia it led the effort of rebuilding nations from the ashes of war. Engineers, logisticians, educators, civil affairs, medical personnel and a number of other professionals lent their expertise to reconstruction. As these professionals worked with the local populace to replace brick and mortar, they were able to expose them to democratization and to infuse them with democratic principles. The result of such nation-building efforts was strong and independent allies.

In recent years the U.S. has taken on nation-building duties in a number of countries. Following Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, U.S. military nation-building efforts ". . . contributed to the legitimacy of the fledgling government. . . re-established essential services and helped with a long term project to improve school facilities." In Bangladesh, U.S. military personnel have trained the population in disaster relief and assisted them in developing the infrastructure required to deal with natural disasters. According to the U.S. ambassador, "[the training] . . . has helped . . . cement a

solid relationship between the United States and the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh . . . enhanced Bangladeshi self-sufficiency for disaster relief operations . . . and raised the level of technical expertise in the Bangladesh military." Other nation-building efforts have been carried out in Peru (a road building program), Columbia (counter-narcotics), Somalia (humanitarian assistance) and many more countries.

U.S. efforts at nation-building have not always been successful. "Too often the United States has responded to requests for assistance or, even worse, imposed assistance without giving due consideration to what a country actually needs."<sup>10</sup> Such was the case in Vietnam. Programs like the Marines' Combined Action Platoons and the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) were steps in the right direction--coordinating military and civilian efforts in nation-building--, but they came too late. So, despite attempts at nation-building and democratization, the U.S. failed. It realized too late that Vietnam needed something it could not provide--a legitimate government.

Finally, U.S. nation-building efforts in Panama following Operation Just Cause were fragmented and poorly executed. In an effort to expeditiously restore order--by establishing a police force--the U.S. made some key mistakes. First, in an attempt to coordinate the views of different U.S. agencies, the desires of the Panamanian government were ignored. Second, it appeared to many that the military was infringing on areas of civilian

authority. The military admits this did occur ". . . but only because higher-level policy makers were simply not making decisions on critical issues. . . . The lack of leadership at the embassy until [Ambassador] Hinton's arrival, forced decisions to be made at inappropriate levels."<sup>11</sup>

This cursory review of U.S. nation-building efforts illustrates several key lessons. First, the U.S. military possesses the skills, which no other single organization can duplicate, needed to succeed at nation-building. Second, nation-building works if applied correctly, meaning the U.S. should not attempt to force assistance upon a country. Rather, the it should "identify and strengthen individuals of democratic belief . . . aid their ascent to office . . . [and] if they reach power . . . stabilize their regimes, through the kind of aid, for example, that was so instrumental in establishing democracy's grip on the loyalties of Japanese and Germans."<sup>12</sup>

Finally, nation-building efforts must be coordinated between civilian agencies and the military. Although the ambassador is the key element in nation-building efforts, the CINC must be involved to ensure military assets are properly employed, and that forward presence is effectively obtained.

## CHAPTER III

### FORWARD PRESENCE

Forward presence operations of U.S. forces demonstrate our commitment, foster regional stability, lend credibility to our alliances, and enhance our crisis response capability. In addition to traditional activities such as exercises, deployments, port visits, military-to-military contacts, security assistance, [and] countering terrorism . . . our military forces may be called upon to execute less traditional operations. These include newly defined roles for the military in the war on drugs and in providing humanitarian assistance.<sup>13</sup>

One of the four foundations of the national defense strategy is forward presence. It contributes to effective peacetime engagement by creating strong links between the U.S. and countries vital to U.S. interests. It also helps to ensure the security of key regions by introducing the stabilizing influence of U.S. involvement. As a result, forward presence is a mainstay for the success of U.S. strategic objectives.

Since World War II, U.S. presence around the globe has been crucial to preventing war and resolving crisis. This presence has usually been in the form of U.S. forces, but not always. Many times U.S. presence has taken the form of alliances, assistance and expertise. Often, just the knowledge that the U.S. was committed to a country averted possible chaos.

Today, the world of the last fifty years has changed. Old traditional threats are being replaced with non-traditional ones; new methods and means are needed to maintain world stability; and the credibility of U.S. forward presence is being called into question. This last point is particularly true as

U.S. forces are downsized and withdrawn from overseas. Therefore, it is important that U.S. forward presence be re-thought in order to keep it "vital to the maintenance of the system of collective defense . . ."<sup>14</sup>

The job of re-thinking and re-defining U.S. forward presence has been given to the CINCs. As a regional commander, each CINC must monitor regional events; insure that U.S. interests are being protected and advanced; establish and maintain stability; and plan for the defense of his region. The bottom line is that the CINC takes the strategic objectives of forward presence and translates them into day-to-day actions. To accomplish this each CINC must utilize all elements of national power--economic, diplomatic, informational and military. This is particularly true in peacetime, when he must work with ambassadors and country teams to integrate resources and develop means to support forward presence. One means of promoting forward presence and reinforcing regional security is through nation-building.

## CHAPTER IV

### NATION-BUILDING

Nation-building involves combining all elements of national power in a coordinated approach, and applying them in support of both the ambassador's country plan and the CINC's regional plans. The result is the promotion of long-term stability; development of sound institutions and supportive infrastructure; and an environment that allows political change and economic progress to occur in the target country.<sup>15</sup>

Nation-building is not an isolated or singular mission. It requires all elements of U.S. national power, as well as, the cooperative actions of the host nation government. Without both these essential requirements stability within the host nation and subsequently the region cannot be obtained.

To provide the elements of U.S. national power required for nation-building takes a great deal of coordination and effort. There are a number of means available for doing this but they are not consolidated. Instead, they are separated amongst a number of government agencies. This lack of centralization can impede the nation-building process by fostering individual efforts that are not synergistic. The result can be disjointed programs, e.g., bridges with no roads leading to them, or health facilities without water, that fail to achieve the intended objectives.<sup>16</sup>

There are a number of means already available for nation-building. The key is properly integrating them into a workable plan that achieves common goals, and then executing it. Frequently, the U.S. offers or imposes assistance without considering the actual needs of a country or its effect on the regional strategy. Thus, the requirement to coordinate all aspects of national power--diplomatic, informational, economic and military--is needed to ensure proper assistance is provided.<sup>17</sup>

To assist in integrating nation-building assets into an effective program, each ambassador has a country team. The country team is an advisory group made up of representatives of various U.S. agencies including: the military services, Security Assistance Organization (SAO), US Agency for International Development (USAID), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and other agencies that might be present in the host nation. The team's function is to ensure positive direction for nation-building programs by "seeing that all activities are necessary, are efficiently and economically administered, and are effectively interrelated."<sup>18</sup>

The CINC assists in the coordinating of assets within his region. He accomplishes this mainly by interfacing with his region's ambassadors. He does this on two levels. First, he has a personal one-on-one relationship with the ambassador. Such a relationship allows him to coordinate efforts at an executive level and provides for an easier melding of diplomatic

and military goals. Next, the CINC through a representative has a relationship in a "coordinating capacity" with the ambassador's country team. "The team coordinates many activities under the CINC's control because of their political and military implications. This coordination ensures continuity of effort and eliminates politically counterproductive initiatives."<sup>19</sup> This arrangement allows the CINC to meld regional concerns with the ambassador's local concerns. It also allows a means for the ambassador to approve all CINC initiatives planned for his country of responsibility.

Besides his relationship with the ambassador, the CINC has a relationship with the SAO assigned to each country. The SAO is a joint organization which reports to the CINC, the ambassador and the director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency. It oversees all military matters and DOD security assistance functions in its assigned country. The ambassador directs the SAO on all matters pertaining to the diplomatic mission while the CINC does so on operational matters. Each SAO is tailored to a specific country and is known by a variety of names depending on the country. These names include Joint US Military Advisory Group, US Military Training Mission, Defense Field Office or Office of Defense Cooperation.<sup>20</sup>



## CHAPTER IV

### NATION BUILDING PROGRAMS

As already discussed, nation-building is an integration of national assets to provide the means to resolve the social, economic, political and military problems of developing countries. A number of programs exist to accomplish this end. Some are military in nature, but most are not. However, all contribute to the stability, security, and development of a nation. Several programs in which the CINC is actively involved are discussed in this chapter.

Security Assistance. Security assistance was a critical element of U.S. foreign policy throughout the Cold War. For over forty years it was used to further U.S. foreign policy by stabilizing countries vital to U.S. interests. Now, with the demise of the Cold War many feel the need for security assistance has diminished. The truth is quite contrary. Because of emerging countries with grave internal problems; hostile nations that are arming themselves for offensive reasons; and traditional world powers reducing their military capability and their presence, the world is becoming less stable. These changes are creating a widening security gap. In order to address this gap, the U.S. must "seek to provide more security to its friends and allies, by allowing them to maintain their own defensive capabilities. Security assistance has the potential to address [this] . . . problem, by furnishing a

method for sustaining close international ties and providing the means to enhance stability for emerging national entities."<sup>21</sup>

The CINC is a central player in the security assistance process. He is connected to the Secretary of Defense (via the JCS), the military services, the ambassador and the SAO. This multi-level access to key players in the security assistance development process affords him the opportunity to make recommendations ". . . on any aspect of security assistance . . . which can be interpreted by the Unified Commander [CINC] and his staff as providing a green light for complete participation in the security assistance process for the affected AOR."<sup>22</sup>

Always, the CINC must consider security assistance in relation to his operational plans for his AOR. Therefore, he must push to tailor security assistance so that it compliments the deliberate planning process. As the CINC assesses the threats and devises either operations plans (OPLAN) or concept plans (CONPLAN), he must include security assistance as a variable. If an operational plan is restricted by either a lack of resources or regional access, security assistance may make the difference. Possible solutions offered by security assistance resources may include: host nation self-sufficiency (precluding the need for U.S. force); pre-positioned supplies in the host country; or U.S. trained and equipped host nation forces fighting along side U.S. forces. Whatever the scenario might be, the CINC can use security assistance as a force or resource multiplier.<sup>23</sup>

"The staff of the unified command plays an important role in making security assistance plans and proposals to JCS, and in coordinating regional, administrative, and specific technical aspects of security assistance."<sup>24</sup> Therefore, once security assistance needs are determined, the unified command must coordinate those needs with the ambassador and the SAO to devise a country/region strategy. This strategy is then reflected in the ambassador's Annual Integrated Assessment for Security Assistance (AIASA) report. The AIASA report ". . . provides an annual assessment approved by the ambassador on that country's security situation and program requirements. Each regional command [CINC] also provides separate comments and recommendations on the countries within its area of responsibility."<sup>25</sup> These reports will drive the funding and allocation of security assistance resources for the country and region.

International Military Education and Training. The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program is another essential nation-building asset. IMET is under the auspices of the security assistance program and involves the training of key military personnel as well as senior defense-related management officials from civilian ministries. "For many U.S. Ambassadors or regional military Commanders in Chief, a small IMET program in a particular country has advanced much larger American interests, such as trade and investment, or military or political cooperation."<sup>26</sup>

IMET is important for several reasons. The most obvious is that it increases the expertise and efficiency of the local military, not only in war fighting skills but nation-building skills. This infusion of knowledge and proficiency then helps to strengthen the country, and as a result, contribute to regional stability and security. Another big attribute of IMET is that it helps to spread the principles of democracy.

The exposure of foreign military and government personnel to democratization through IMET will hopefully have a lasting influence on them.

"At a time when many countries are struggling to emerge from decades of authoritarian and totalitarian rule, fledgling democracies are badly in need of help in learning to control/overcome the entrenched bureaucratic vestiges of the old regime. This training should give civilians and military alike the standing and the credentials to work with one another to strengthen their democratic institutions and rationally manage defense resources."<sup>27</sup>

Finally, the personal relationships developed during IMET training enrich the bonds between foreign and U.S. personnel. "IMET fosters important military linkages throughout the world that are essential to preserving the security of our friends and allies, as well as for advancing the global security interests of the United States."<sup>28</sup> From the CINC's perspective IMET can fill in some of the resource holes identified in Plans and CONPLANS. An effective IMET program provides either self-sufficient indigenous troops or well-trained, motivated and loyal allies to support the CINC's mission in time of crisis.

Mobile Training Teams. In addition to IMET mobile training teams (MTT) are available to train foreign personnel. These teams are used when either a foreign nation cannot send its people to the U.S. for training or no other training course is available to accomplish the required training. In these instances a team of U.S. military specialists are sent to a foreign country to train its personnel in a particular skill.

MTT requests and requirements are submitted by the U.S. SAO. This is accomplished annually during the Unified Command Security Assistance Training Program Management Review. Although a representative of the CINC coordinates the SAO's requests, the SAO is tasked with the administration and operational control of the MTT during its time in-country. The SAO is also responsible for keeping the CINC informed of the MTT's activities."

Although conducted in-country, MTT serves the same purpose as IMET. Besides providing technical training and strengthening their capabilities, it introduces foreign nationals to U.S. beliefs and method, and forges a stronger bond between them and the U.S.

International Maritime Law Enforcement Team (IMLET). IMLET is part of the United States' counter-narcotics operations. It is run by the Coast Guard, and is active in several countries, particularly in South America. Although it is actively involved in counter-narcotics, IMLET's mission extends beyond just stopping drug traffickers. Its overall purpose is to help

develop the maritime and law enforcement infrastructure of a country. By working with a country's coast guard, navy or law enforcement agency IMLET helps that country build a relationship between its government and its populace; and strengthens that country's sense of democracy by exposing its law enforcement agencies to the principles of democratic law enforcement. As one IMLET team member in Bolivia summed it up, "We have an opportunity to share 200 years of experience balancing human rights with law enforcement. . . ."30

Although the Coast Guard does not work for the Department of Defense, under the new Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) the CINC, has ". . . the authority to plan for the Coast Guard's use."31 Therefore, a CINC should factor such Coast Guard programs as IMLET into his nation-building equation. In situations where political sensitivities are a concern, the Coast Guard might be the perfect choice for forward presence. Its missions and structure make it less threatening to many countries, particularly those with small navies. One CINC has said of the Coast Guard, ". . . the Coast Guard has been instrumental in the continuing . . . operations, in managing our theater . . . program, and in the conduct of . . . training for . . . nations. From our experience, it can be seen that the Coast Guard can play an important role in nation building and naval diplomacy."32

Civil Affairs and Civic Action. In peacetime low intensity conflict, mission objectives are often political and not

military. Consequently, political legitimacy and not military capability becomes the center of gravity. As a result, public support becomes crucial because the legitimacy of political authority depends on it."

The mission of civil affairs operations and their resultant civic actions is to mobilize public support. To accomplish this task the CINC has access to a number of specialists in such fields as labor relations, commercial supply, transportation, public works and food production/storage. In addition to these experts, other specialists, including engineers, lawyers, medical personnel and logisticians, play essential roles in civil affairs and civic action. Key among this group are the logisticians.

"It has been said that amateurs practice tactics and professionals practice logistics."<sup>34</sup> This is especially true in civil affairs matters. Without the supplies and services provided by logisticians, other specialists could not begin their missions. Experience has shown that logistics ". . . can have a decisive psychological impact in building legitimacy by providing supplies and services for nation-building. This in itself can alleviate the causes of insurgency. . . . [Thus], logistics elements may precede combat units into the AO or may be the only force to deploy."<sup>35</sup> Also, they may remain behind in the AO after combat units have departed, as witnessed in Somalia.

Most civic action projects accomplished in support of civil affairs are engineer related. U.S. military engineering resources, which include Army combat engineers and the Navy construction battalions, can provide assistance in such areas as public works, transportation, communication, sanitation and others. This assistance is provided mainly by helping local military engineers with "self help" projects. Such assistance helps the development of the country's infrastructure; enhances the military's standing with the community; and strengthens the local government. Additionally, civic action projects help to improve perceptions of the U.S. and create positive bonds between the U.S. and the assisted country."

It is important to note that there is a difference between military civic action and action sponsored by the State Department. Military civic action is limited in scope and has been made more so by recent legislation. This legislation restricts military construction activities to only those necessary for the conduct of military exercises. Further, projects cannot involve permanent construction unless the CINC has access to them in future exercises. Within these guidelines CINCs have found ways to incorporate humanitarian and civic action projects into exercise related construction. One such way is Engineer Readiness and Training Exercises (ENRETE). These exercises, which provide training for both active duty and reserve engineer units, include exercise related construction



projects which are of benefit to the host nation. Thus, the military units are trained and assistance is provided."

A final note on civic action projects. Although the CINC controls the fiscal and manpower resources for these projects, he does not decide which ones will be undertaken. Instead, he must coordinate all nation-building projects with the individual ambassadors in his region because they decide which projects will be undertaken. This civilian oversight is necessary in order to maintain the region's political balance. A project in the wrong country, at the wrong time, could upset this balance. As in the hula, "every little movement has a meaning all its own."

Foreign Internal Defense. "Nation-building or internal development is already recognized as a means of countering active insurgency. This approach has been referred to, in part, as foreign internal defense [FID]."<sup>7</sup>

FID seems to have at least two aspects to it. One aspect is addressed in the Army's Civil Affairs Operations manual, FM 41-10, as ". . . operations that involve military forces in short-term projects useful to the local population."<sup>8</sup> The other aspect involves supplying FID-unique equipment to a country. That is equipment tailored ". . . to meet the unique equipment needs of the Third World. . . .For instance, the problem might

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<sup>7</sup> Telephone conversation with CAPT C. F. Deal, USN, Chief Nations Assistance Division, U.S. Atlantic Command, Norfolk, VA, 29 April 1993.

involve removing wounded. Instead of ordering an expensive, difficult to maintain helicopter . . . a simple, inexpensive aircraft requiring low pilot skills [could be ordered]. . ."

The CINCs' role in FID is to ". . . define the needs of those countries within their areas of responsibility having requirements for FID-unique equipment,"<sup>40</sup> and make those needs known to the civilian and military leadership. Additionally, the CINCs would identify to the respective U.S. ambassador those projects needed for a particular country's development and security.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSIONS

Nation-building is not a new mission for the operational commander. It was once his primary duty after defense of the country. However, over the years the nature of nation-building changed. It went from an imperialistic venture prior to the Second World War, to a tool for physically re-building nations in that war's aftermath. During the past five decades, it was a means of containing communism. Now, with the demise of the Cold War, nation-building must be viewed in a new context.

Today, nation-building must be seen by the operational commander as a means of forward presence. With the reduction of U.S. forces and the closing of overseas bases, it may be the only means available to him for maintaining security and stability in parts of his region. Consequently, nation-building programs will be used increasingly as symbols of U.S. presence. Instead of a port visit by a battle group or an air force wing based overseas, U.S. forward presence will be an IMLET in Bolivia; Army engineers building roads in Peru; or U.S. forces delivering food in Somalia.

It is important to U.S. strategy that the operational commander execute the nation-building mission effectively. Therefore, he must familiarize himself with nation-building programs; coordinate with his region's ambassadors on the best programs to pursue; utilize all means of national power to

initiate them; and ensure that the programs are sought by the host nation, and that they will have the desired positive effect, on the nation and U.S. objectives.

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